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COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND FOREIGN
COMPANIES: THE MUTUALLY
REINFORCING PRINCIPLES OF
REMEDIAL ANTITRUST AND NATIONAL
TREATMENT

The fundamental goal of remedial antitrust is the creation and
maintenance of the optimum competitive environment in markets
disrupted by monopolistic control or illegal trade restraints. 1 Implementation of this goal may be through orders prescribing or prohibiting
certain conduct, 2 or demanding the sale of some of the defendant's assets. 3
I. 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW AND PROCEDURE, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 136 n.19 (1979) (testimony of Stephen M. Axinn,
Miles W. Kilpatrick, and Malcolm M. Pfunder, Task Force Panel in Structural Relief Issues,
Antitrust Section, American Bar Association) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N);
ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL IV-64 (1979) (adequate
antitrust relief should "(l) stop the illegal practices alleged in the comP,laint, (2) prevent their
renewal and (3) restore and monitor competitive conditions"). [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST
DIVISION MANUAL].
_,
,
.. --·
..
.
This goal differs from "perfect competition" in that it recognizes that the costs and difficulties
of judicial relief will at some point outweigh any marginal improvement in competitive conditions. Considerations include the social cost - public and private - of litigating the issue, the
"inevitable frictions of the restructuring process," and the possibility of erroneous judgment
and inefficient relief. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ,, 131, 265 (3d ed. 1981). For this reason
the concept also has been termed "workable competition." United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp. 110 F. Supp. 295, 346-47 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); I NAT'L
ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra at 121. Much has been written on workable competition. See, e.g.,
C. FERGUSON, A MACROECONOMIC THEORY OF WORKABLE COMPETITION (1964); aark, Toward
a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940); Knox, Workable Competition and Public Policy, I ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Spring 1968, at 41 (1968); Markham,
An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 349
(1950); Sosnick, A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 72 Q.J. ECON. 380 (1958).
2. These orders seek to gradually eliminate anticompetitive restraints by forbidding particular
practices. Conduct or injunctive decrees, however, have "often proved to be ineffective and unwieldly," and therefore are disfavored. NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra note I, at 117-18.
Neverthless, this form of relief is found in a vast number of cases. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
· 3. This is structural relief or "trust-busting." It is based on the economic theory that market
structure influences competitive performance. See P. AREEDA supra note I, at 1 134. The remedy
for antitrust violations stemming from excessive market power is the reduction of such power
through the forced sale of the violator's assets to appropriate firms. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT,
THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-54 (1976). The Supreme Court
has approved and encouraged the use of structural relief. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578, 580 (1966); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366
U.S. 316, 329-31 (1961). Statutory authority for such relief is derived from the Sherman Act
§ 4, IS U.S.C. § 4 (1976), and the Clayton Act§ IS, IS U.S.C. § 25 (1976). The Federal Trade
Commission secures similar power from § 11 of the Clayton Act, and from the Federal Trade
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The antitrust tribunal4 formulating relief must consider underlying market
circumstances, including the competitive position of all significant
suppliers. s
Foreign6 firms supply a growing portion of United States markets;'
consequently, their impact must be .carefully weighed when formulating
effective antitrust relief. Antitrust tribunals, however, have been slow
to adopt remedial orders that recognize the new-found prominence of
foreign firms. Indeed, many antitrust decrees have neglected to provide for foreign firms altogether; others have merely lumped these firms
in over-inclusive groups based solely upon their foreign ownership. 8
There are many strong economic arguments for ignoring the alienage
of firms and keying only on their market status. 9 Moreover, overlooking foreign suppliers in remedial orders is especially egregious in light
of the nondiscrimination, or "national treatment," provisions found
in a wide array of United States commercial treaties. 10 This national
treatment protection encompasses the complete range of economic and
legal considerations necessary to place the foreign firm on the same
competitive footing as its domestic rivals, including the right to full
Commission Act§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Law and Procedure found structural relief the most effective and certain remedy in Sherman Act § 2 and Clayton Act § 7 cases. It concluded that courts should order structural relief
whenever a violation involving market power has been shown. I NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra
note I, at 114-19. For examples of representative structural decrees see infra text accompanying
notes 36, 41, 42.
4. The tribunal most often will be either a court or the Federal Trade Commission, although
it may be a regulatory agency such as the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Interstate Commerce
Commission. See Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305-06, 310, 312
(1962); see also P. AREEDA, supra note l, at 1 179.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 33-45.
6. In this Note, "foreign" refers to ownership or control by non-United States persons or
companies. This definition encompasses United States branches and domestically incorporated
subsidiaries of foreign companies.
7. The United States has become increasingly dependent upon foreign imports. Between 1967
and 1977, manufacturing imports rose from 7. I OJo to l 70Jo of gross domestic product. 2 NAT'L
ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra note l, at 310. In 1980, total imports were $316.5 billion. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 422
(Table 702) (1981) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
8. See infra notes 59-84 and accompanying text.
9. The foremost reason is consumer welfare. Allowing foreign firms to operate on the same
basis as their domestic rivals will raise competitive pressures and reduce prices. This underlies
the Supreme Court's famous statement that "[i)t is competition, not competitors, which the (Sherman] Act protects." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Losses resulting
from preferences for domestic industry are described infra at note 55.
10. These provisions prohibit governmental discrimination against foreign companies operating
within the territory of the other nation. They are commonly included in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") Treaties the United States has with several dozen foreign nations.
Avigliano [sic] v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); see Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374,
2380 & n.13 (1982). For a complete list of these treaties see OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1982).
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and fair recognition in antitrust remedial actions. Antitrust orders containing disparate provisions for domestic and foreign firms therefore
violate national treatment guarantees unless based upon legitimate
economic criteria applied uniformly to all suppliers.
This Note argues that greater appreciation for the nature and importance of national treatment obligations will compel tribunals fashioning antitrust relief to provide more suitably for foreign firms, and thus
avoid straining international trade relations.'' Moreover, because antitrust relief and national treatment objectives are mutually reinforcing,
greater recognition of national treatment requirements should improve
remedial orders from the standpoint of antitrust economics. 12 Meeting
national treatment requirements should place little added burden on
the antitrust tribunal; it must merely extend impartial economic analysis
to all market suppliers, not just domestic firms.
This Note explores methods to ensure that antitrust relief orders satisfy
both national treatment and remedial antitrust principles. Part I considers the history, purpose, and effects of national treatment obligations, focusing on their impact on foreign investment. Part II follows
by inquiring into the essentials of effective antitrust relief. It emphasizes
the need for remedial orders to be tailored on two levels; the first,
corresponding to the market's overall characteristics, and the second,
to the differences between individual market suppliers. Part III devises
an analytical framework reconciling national treatment and remedial
antitrust principles, and accordingly analyzes decisions attempting to
accommodate these principles. The Note concludes by urging the adoption of requirements for the explicit use of economic reasoning to support discriminatory orders.
I.

NATIONAL TREATMENT GUARANTEES

· National treatment is one of many treaty regulations in the international trade arena. 13 It guarantees "equal protection" both to domestic
companies operating abroad and to foreign competitors active in the
United States. ' 4 A typical national treatment clause warrants that
11. Disregard of national treatment obligations may generate foreign hostility, in the form
of simple bureaucratic obstruction or even open governmental retaliation, to United States companies operating abroad. The economic impact on the United States could be great; in 1980,
American exports reached $339.8 billion, constituting 12.9% of gross national product.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 7, at 422 (Table 702); see also infra text accompanying note
104.

12. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
13. Numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements extend coverage to all aspects of international economic relations. For comprehensive treatment, see A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW (1975).
14. Avigliano [sic] v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); see also Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Com-
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"[n]ationals and companies 15 of either Party shall be accorded national
treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial,
financial and other business activities within the territories of the other
Party." 16 Separate, more specific clauses commonly follow, dealing
with subjects such as taxation, unemployment, access to the courts,
patents, and the acquisition of property.1 7 A foreign company protected by national treatment thus can invest abroad confident of its
competitive footing because its rights and privileges are defined by those
accorded similarly situated domestic firms. 18
Present United States commercial treaties commonly include national
treatment obligations.1 9 This was not true prior to World War II; early
merce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 811 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Modern
Treaties].
15. "Companies" is ambiguous; its meaning in this context was recently at issue before the
United States Supreme Court. The Court's decision appears to limit national treatment protection to domestic branches of foreign companies, and exclude from such protection foreign subsidiaries incorporated domestically.
The case Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982), involved alleged
employment discrimination on the basis of Japanese citizenship. The defendant, a wholly-owned,
domestically incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese firm, sought to shield itself behind a FCN
treaty provision allowing "Japanese companies" to hire specialized employees "of their choice."
Id. at 2377. The Supreme Court ruled that unlike domestic branches of foreign firms, domestically
incorporated subsidiaries of foreign firms are constituted under the laws of Delaware, California, or some other state, thereby becoming United States companies. The FCN treaty protection
was thus unavailable, as they were "entitled to the rights, and subject to the responsibilities
of other domestic corporations." The Court focused on the treaty language and emphasized
that this was the present interpretation of the State Department and the Japanese foreign ministry.
Id. at 2379-82.
In a footnote the Court expressly reserved judgment as to the interpretation of other FCN
treaties which, "although similarly worded, may have different negotiating histories." Id. at
2380 n.12. The great majority of United States FCN treaties were negotiated around the same
time and with much the same language, however, and it seems unlikely that the Avag/iano decision
will be so limited. Nevertheless, the Court's great reliance on the treaty parties' interpretations
could lead to a contrary result if the parties to a different FCN treaty agreed on a construction
inconsistent with the treaty in A vagliano.
16. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
art. Vll(l), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069, T.l.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese FCN Treaty].
17. Other subjects dealt with in separate national treatment clauses include the sale, distribution, and use of products; workers' compensation, insurance, and social security; the control,
establishment, and acquisition of companies; unlawful searches, and the protection and security
of persons; takings of property and nationalization; professional activities; trade names, trade
labels, and industrial property; funds transfers; importation and exportation; shipping; and engagement in scientific, educational, religious, and philanthropic activities. See, e.g., id.; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043,
T.1.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United StatesFederal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.1.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United States-Denmark, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.l.A.S. No. 4797
[hereinafter cited as Danish FCN Treaty].
18. Defining the protection in relative or contingent terms has advantages for the host country
as well. The built-in regulation and adjustment mechanism of a contingent standard adapts
automatically to changing conditions. The alternative noncontingent standard leaves open the
possibility of preferences for foreign companies. Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 14, at 810-12.
19. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 2380-81 (1982).
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commercial treaties generally did not grant companies any rights, but
dealt only with the rights and privileges of individuals. 20 Indeed, until
the twentieth century, corporations had no legal status or access to
the courts in foreign countries. 21 The expansion of international corporate trade, however, necessitated new treaties granting corporations
legal status and court access. 22 United States postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") Treaties 23 enlarged the rights of corporations by approving the right to conduct business in foreign nations. 24
The inclusion of national treatment obligations in these FCN treaties
assures foreign business entities of nondiscriminatory treatment in all
aspects of their United States business activities. 25
The primary reason for bringing corporations within the scope of
commercial treaties is to encourage international trade and investment. 26
Such trade and investment brings important benefits to every trading
country through greater economic growth, increased income and investment, and expanded access to capital, resources, and technology. 21
Because foreign investors are influenced by the legal conditions existing in the potential host country, successful commercial treaties must
ensure a policy of legal equity and hospitality. This includes assurances
that the foreign entity and its property will be respected and that the
enterprise will be accorded equal treatment vis-a-vis domestic companies. 28 In the United States, a key legal concern for foreign firms
is antitrust treatment. Without assurances that they will not be competitively handicapped by discriminatory remedial orders, foreign firms
will be deterred from extensive domestic activity. 29
20. Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L
L. 373, 373-80 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Provisions on Companies].
21. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. at 2380.
22. Id.
23. These treaties are self-executing - binding domestic law without the need for implementing
legislation. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), Inc., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982). Under the Constitution such treaties are "the supreme
law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
24. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. at 2381 & n.17; see also Walker, Provisions on Companies, supra
note 20, at 380.
25. Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment, 5 AM.
J. COMP. L. 229, 232 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Treaties for Foreign Investment].
26. Id. at 231-34; see also Hearing on Commercial Treaties Before the Subcomm. on Com-.
mercial Treaties and Consular Conventions of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 Hearing); Hearing on the Commercial Treaties with
Iran, Nicaragua, and the Netherlands Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1956).
27. See generally M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 214-40 (3d
ed. 1979); 1952 Hearing, supra note 26, at 4.
28. See Walker, Treaties for Foreign Investment, supra note 25, at 230; see also 1952 Hearing, supra note 26, at 4.
29. Many commercial treaties in fact include a provision concerning antitrust enforcement.
The clause is, however, basically hortatory. It commonly states that monopoly and collusive
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THE ESSENTIALS OF EFFECTIVE ANTITRUST REMEDIES

Antitrust law focuses on market structure and economic performance
and uses broad powers to restore and maintain effective competition
in markets affected by anticompetitive restraints. 30 To accomplish this,
antitrust tribunals have been given extensive discretion to mold equitable
relief. 31 Effective relief demands a far-reaching analysis of market structure and economic performance, including inquiry into a wide range
of financial, economic, tax, and related matters. 32 The exigencies of
a particular market often demand complex relief orders incorporating
a combination of remedies. 33
Because remedial measures must cure an array of market-specific
competitive impairments, 34 a comparable array of remedial provisions
has been required. 35 For example, orders have called for the offending
firm or firms to create competitors, 36 to supply goods and services to
all who wish to buy, 37 and to make patents, trademarks, trade secrets,
or know-how available to competitors on a reasonable-royalty 38 or
royalty-free basis. 39 Remedial measures also have altered the terms on

behavior is harmful to commerce, and that "each Party agrees upon the request of the other
Party to consult with respect to any such practices and to take such measures as it deems appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects." See, e.g., Japanese FCN Treaty, supra
note 16, art. XVIII(!); Danish FCN Treaty, supra note 17, art. XVIII(!).
30. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 152-53 (1948); Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947). See also I NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra note I, at
120-21, 132; ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note I, at IV-64.
31. See, e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 353 U.S. 419, 428 (1956) (explaining that the Commission is given wide discretion to determine "the type of order that is necessary to bring an
end to the unfair practices found to exist .... It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts
will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful
practices found to exist."); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947)
(district courts have "large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case"); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 (1944); United States
V. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 428 (2d Cir. 1974); see also ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL,
supra note I, at IV-64.
32. See I NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra note I, at 116.
33. Id. at 132. See also ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note I, at IV-64.
34. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 327 (1978); I NAT'L ANTITRUST
COMM'N, supra note I, at 132.
35. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 34, at'1 327; I NArL ANTITRUST CoMM'N,
supra note I, at 120, 131-32.
36. See Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1%9); see
also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
37. See, e.g., Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); Airfix
Corp. v. Aurora Plastics Corp., 222 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Pa. 1%3); Theatre Investment Co.
v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 72 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Wash. 1947).
38. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417 (1945).
39. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly and Co., 95 F.T.C. 538 (1980); United States v. Coca-Cola
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which a firm buys or sells, 40 prevented a firm from supplying itself, 41
required a firm to disengage from several lines of integrated business, 42
and compelled individuals to resign from management positions. 43
Moreover, not only must antitrust remedies be tailored to the specific
market, they also must apply within the market on a class or single
firm basis. 44 Appropriate relief therefore must analyze individual firm
competence and resources in such areas as technological know-how,
raw material reserves, marketing facilities and techniques, past sales,
customer goodwill, and management ability. 45 Because capabilities
among industry competitors inevitably vary, antitrust relief rarely provides identical treatment for each competitor. Indeed, relief orders have
discriminated by excluding certain industry members as potential acquiring companies under a divestiture order on the basis of market
share, 46 and prospective geographic operating area. 47 Mandatory patent
licensing orders also have discriminated in favor of new market entrants48
and against specific dominant firms. 49 Often, the firms subject to
Bottling Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,277 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. General
Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 844-45 (D.N.J. 1953).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd,
405 U.S. 562 (1972).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Pullman Co., 1944-45 Trade Cas. (CCH) 157,242 (E.D. Pa.
1944) ("It is a purpose of this judgment to separate completely and perpetually the Sleeping
Car Business from the Manufacturing Business and to separate completely and perpetually the
ownership and control of each Business from the ownership and control of the other, irrespective of who owns or controls such Business.").
43. See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188 (1944).
44. It is very often administratively superior and economically sound simply to tailor relief
to groups of firms on the basis of ranges of economic criteria. See, e.g., infra note 46.
45. For an example of the application of this principle to a specific market see W. Mueller,
Comments on the Federal Trade Commission's Proposed Consent Agreement in the Matter of
Eli Lilly and Company (1980) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Stroh Brewery Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,817, 47
Fed. Reg. 18,445 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1982) (proposed consent decree compelling divestiture of
one of two breweries to any buyer other than Anheuser-Busch or Miller, the two dominant brewing companies in the pertinent market); United States v. KDI Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH)
174,153 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (requiring defendant to divest itself of swimming pool franchises to
entities that in the past had installed no more than five percent of the swimming pools in southern
California); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 72,988 (N.D. Ohio
1970) (ordering the divestiture of filling stations in Ohio and western Pennsylvania in part to
persons not accounting for more than two percent of all motor fuel sales in the affected areas
during preceding year).
47. See, e.g., United States v. American Ship Bldg. Co., 1973-1 Trade Cas.-(CCH) 174,261,
at 93,248 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (ordering defendant to sell three ships to buyers who will operate
them on Great Lakes between United States ports).
48. See, e.g., In re Illinois Cent. Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1097 (1973), otherwise modified,
86 F.T.C. 1194 (1975) (consent decree requiring defendant to license patents and know-how to
a single "eligible firm" not then engaged in the relevant market).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bristol-Myers Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,738 (D.D.C.
1979) (approving a consent order in which defendant, Beecham, Ltd., agreed to grant licenses
and sell pharmaceutical products in bulk to entities other than co-defendant Bristol-Myers and
its subsidiaries).
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discrimination have been neither parties to the proceedings nor wrongdoers. 50 In short, the only valid consideration in formulating antitrust
relief is the impact on market competition; all other factors, including
corporate nationality, are irrelevant. 51
Ill.

PROVIDING FOR NATIONAL TREATMENT
IN ANTITRUST REMEDIES

Antitrust relief and national treatment provisions should be recognized
as mutually reinforcing; each is founded on the belief that robust competition will greatly benefit consumers. 52 Unfortunately, antitrust
tribunals have not recognized the coherence of the two principles; some
have even deemed the principles conflicting. 53 This is ironic because
antitrust relief will comply with national treatment obligations if
tribunals simply use objective economic analysis without regard to
alienage considerations. Requiring tribunals to be more explicit in their
economic analysis should result in closer adherence to national treatment obligations and improved antitrust relief orders.

A. The Complementary and Reinforcing Nature
of National Treatment and Antitrust Principles
Understanding how national treatment and antitrust principles reinforce each other requires an appreciation of the role and purpose of
international trade obligations. 54 These obligations complement the anti50. E.g., United States v. Stroh Brewery Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,817, 47 Fed.
Reg. 18,445 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1982) (excluding the two dominant brewers from acquisition of
a divested brewery though they were unassociated with the case); In re Gulf Oil Corp., 56 F.T.C.
688 (1960) (requiring defendant to divest three plants to any buyer except 23 large oil companies
though there were no findings that those oil companies had engaged in illegal conduct and though
they were not parties to the matter).
Antitrust tribunals are to disregard adverse effects on private individuals and companies in
the framing of remedial orders. See Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
395 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1969) ("We have emphasized that the pinch on private interests is not
relevant to fashioning an antitrust decree, as the public interest is our sole concern."); United
States v. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) ("[C]ourts are authorized,
indeed required, to decree relief effective to redress the violations, whatever the adverse effect
of such a decree on private interests.").
51. See infra note 80; see also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 905 (1978) (advocating
consumer welfare, and not political considerations, as the standard for antitrust enforcement).
52. See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 405; see also supra note 9, infra note 80, and infra note
55 and accompanying text.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 59-84.
54. The genesis of international trade regulation was the belief that some "mechanism is
essential to prevent the pursuit of self-interested national regulation of international trade in
a manner that harms other nations and in a manner that, when combined with retaliatory actions,
results in a sharp and chaotic restriction in the over-all level of international trade." J. JACKSON,
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trust laws for they, too, seek to maximize social welfare through increased efficiency. 55 The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition within the United States because competition is viewed as the
most effective means to achieve the lowest cost production. International trade regulations such as national treatment, by promoting international economic competition, further the same goal on a global scale. 56
Accordingly, national treatment obligations embody nothing more
than a commitment to free competition without regard for the nationality of competitors. In the context of antitrust relief, this means that
remedial measures must afford foreign suppliers evenhanded, nondiscriminatory treatment. National treatment obligations, as well as
antitrust principles, demand that relief be based upon objective economic
standards such as technological development, marketing expertise,
distribution capacity, and previous sales. 57 Although prescribed relief
may still grant less favorable treatment to a foreign firm or group of
foreign firms, national treatment principles are not implicated if the
decision is based solely on uncolored economic criteria applied uniformly
to foreign and domestic suppliers. 58 Recent antitrust decisions have not,
however, recognized this distinction.

WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 9 (1969). Jackson identifies three premises underlying
international trade agreements:
(l) International trade is beneficial . . . ;
(2) Self-interest economic policies on the international scene contribute to misunderstanding, instability, and war in international relations generally; and
(3) International agreement on policy is necessary, or at least useful, because independent
national actions to promote trade and stability will usually be frustrated by the
actions of other states.
Id. at 9-10.
55. In theory, free international trade will maximize real income for all countries that produce and trade according to the doctrine of comparative advantage. Interference in trade through
tariffs, quotas, and other preferences has a distorting effect, resulting in inefficient resource
allocation and a loss of total world income. See M. KREININ, supra note 27, at 274-92. Regulations limiting such interferences, therefore, stem this inefficiency and income loss. See supra
note 54; see also Kissinger, Saving the World Economy, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1983, at 46; THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 25, 1982, at 92. Other efficiencies arise from market exchange and economies
of scale. J. JACKSON, supra note 54, at 9.
56. See generally J. Davidow, U.S. Competition Laws, Nontariff Barriers to Trade and the
Role of the Antitrust Division, Remarks at 32d Conference on Aids and Safeguard Measures
in International Trade Law (Oct. 19, 1979) (available from Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice);
J. Shenefield, Competition Advocacy and International Trade: A New Role for Antitrust Policy,
Remarks at ALI-ABA Course of Study on International Antitrust Law (May 26, 1978) (available
from Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Shenefield Remarks].
57. See supra text accompanying note 45.
58. The Second Circuit applied this standard to the similar problem engendered by a general
regulation that has a disproportionate impact on foreign competitors. The court stated that bilateral
treaty commitments required an airport noise regulation, barring the supersonic aircraft Concorde, merely to be "even-handed" and not based on arbitrary criteria. British Airways Bd.
v. Port Auth., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), on remand, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), affdand modified,
564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Past Efforts

Antitrust tribunals appear unaware of their obligation to provide
evenhandedly for both foreign and domestic firms. For instance, some
orders have required compulsory licensing to "qualified domestic applicant[s], "59 "any domestic applicant," 60 "any United States citizen or
domestic corporation," 61 and "any domestic applicant approved by
the Federal Trade Commission. " 62 All of these orders violate principles
of nondiscrimination embodied in national treatment guarantees.
Even those tribunals apprised of national treatment obligations have
ignored such requirements, apparently regarding them as inconsequential. Two cases serve as examples. In the first, Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 63· a federal district court displayed an
unwillingness even to address the merits of a claim that its proposed
relief violated national treatment guarantees. The second case, In re
Eli Lilly & Co., 64 shows the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") caught
in a crossfire brought about by an apparent misunderstanding of its
national treatment obligations.
The plaintiff in Calnetics Corp., an independent manufacturer of
auto air conditioners, sought to enjoin the defendant's acquisition of
a rival domestic auto air conditioner manufacturer, claiming that the
acquisition would foreclose sales opportunities for independent air
conditioner manufacturers, in violation of the Clayton Act. 65 The
district court agreed and also prohibited the defendant from importing automobiles with factory-installed air conditioning. 66 The defendant
Volkswagen and the West German government claimed that the latter
provision illegally discriminated against the German manufacturer of
the vehicles as well as German manufacturers of car air conditioners. 67
59. United States v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) f/ 69,235, at 74,860 (D.
Conn. 1959).
60. United States v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 1964 Trade Cas. f/ 71,144, at 79,513 (D.N.J.
1964).
61. United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 174,467, at 94,079-80
(D. Conn. 1973).
62. In re Koppers Co., 79 F.T.C. 837, 843 (1971).
63. 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976). After remand the case was settled without retrial for monetary
consideration. Letter from Maxwell M. Blecher, Counsel to Calnetics Corp., to the author (Jan.
12, 1982) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
64. 95 F.T.C. 538 (1980).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976). See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Arn., Inc., 348 F. Supp.
606, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1972), enforced, 353 F. Supp. 1219, (C.D. Cal. 1973).
66. 353 F. Supp. at 1221.
67. German auto air conditioner manufacturers would be precluded on a practical basis from
furnishing air conditioners if they could not be installed until the cars reached the United States.
The order also discriminated against the manufacturer because "an important factor in the sale
of automobiles is the availability of integrated, factory-installed air conditioning." Calnetics Corp.,
532 F.2d at 693.
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The district court's response exhibited little appreciation for treaty
law, particularly national treatment obligations. The opinion first noted
that no discrimination was intended by the court's order, the relief
being aimed only at securing an "open and competitive market in
automobile air conditioners for Volkswagen automobiles. " 68 It then
summarily dealt with the United States-West German FCN Treaty, cryptically declaring that "[t]here can be no escape for defendant [Volkswagen] in the claim that it is insulated from its violation by any United
States treaty with Germany. " 69
A similar insensitivity to national treatment guarantees was evidenced in
In re Eli Lilly & Co. 10 The alleged national treatment violation in
Lilly stemmed from a consent order, entered before trial, that discriminated between foreign and domestic suppliers. The FTC order required
Eli Lilly, charged by the Commission with monopolizing the domestic
insulin market, to license its patents and technology at a higher royalty
to foreign companies than to domestic companies. In addition, access to
certain technology and patents was restricted to domestic companies. 11
Two Danish insulin manufacturers 12 and the Danish government objected to the disparate licensing provision on national treatment
grounds. 73 They asserted that a United States treaty with Denmark 74
68. 353 F. Supp. at 1222.
69. Id.
70. 95 F.T.C. 538 (1980).
71. The order required Eli Lilly to license the use of its existing insulin technology, patented
and unpatented, to any domestic company on a royalty-free basis and to any foreign company
at reasonable royalties. It further provided that Eli Lilly license the use of insulin technology
it acquires from others for five years following the order, patented or not, on a non-profit basis
to any domestic company. During this period, Eli Lilly also was to license, at reasonable royalties,
domestic companies' use of United States-patent.ed, insulin-related inventions that it developed.
·No provisions were included for access by foreign companies to the future insulin technology
and inventions. See id. at 546-51.
72. The petitioning parties in Lilly were actually United States incorporated subsidiaries of
Danish companies; as such they were included within the decree's definition of "foreign companies." 95 F.T.C. at 544. As discussed supra note 15, the recent Supreme Court's decision
in Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982), precludes domestic corporations from claiming protection under national treatment provisions. Lilly, however, was litigated
prior to the Avagliano decision, when conventional wisdom was that domestically incorporated
subsidiaries were also covered by national treatment. See, e.g., Spiess v. C. ltoh & Co., 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); Avigliano [sic] v. Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (1981), rev'd and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982). In any event,
the accompanying analysis of Lilly is correct because, were the Lilly dispute to arise today, the
Danish parent companies could be substituted as parties, bringing into play national treatment
protection.
73. Petition of Nordisk-USA to Reopen, 95 F.T.C. at 546-51; Letter from Robert L. Wald,
Robert A. Skitol, and Jeffrey F. Liss, Counsel to Novo Laboratories, Inc., to Carol M. Thomas,
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 23, 1981) Uoining petition of Nordisk-USA) (on file
with the Journal of Law Reform); Note Verbale from Royal Danish Embassy to Department
of State (Oct. 1-4, 1980) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter cited as Danish
Note Verbale].
74. Danish FCN Treaty, supra note 17, arts. VII(!), VIIl(2), XXIl(l) & XXIV.
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and an international declaration signed by the United States 75 precluded
preferential treatment for domestic firms and argued that the Danish
competitors should be granted access to all licenses on equal terms with
domestic firms. 76
In response, Eli Lilly claimed that to do so would bestow more than
equal treatment - that it would actually favor foreign companies because those companies were not injured by Eli Lilly's allegedly illegal conduct and were in no need of such relief to compete effectively. 77
Eli Lilly further maintained that the FTC, as an agency of the United
States government, "owe[d] certain obligations to preserve and promote the well-being of domestic entities. "' 8
The FTC, though refusing to alter the consent order, 79 acknowledged
that the order's provisions were a departure from its general policy
of treating foreign and domestic companies alike. 80 It attempted to
justify the exception, however, by citing without explanation the "special
circumstances" of the case 81 and emphasizing that the order was a
"negotiated compromise between strongly-held positions. " 82 The Com75. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (June 21, 1976).
76. Petition of Nordisk-USA to Reopen, supra note 73; Letter from Robert L. Wald, Robert
A. Skitol, and Jeffrey F. Liss, supra note 73.
77. Response of Eli Lilly and Co. to Petitions of Novo Laboratories, Inc., and Nordisk-USA
Seeking to Amend Consent Order at 24, Lilly, 95 F.T.C. 538 (1980).
78. Id. at 25; see also Response of Eli Lilly and Co. to Comments on Proposed Consent
Order at 6, Lilly, 95 F.T.C. 538 (1980) ("(T]he Government of the United States has a legitimate
interest in the technological advance and competitive success of domestic companies as differentiated from their foreign competitors.").
79. See Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Secretary, FTC, to Robert L. Wald, Robert A. Skitol,
and Jeffrey F. Liss, Counsel to Novo Laboratories, Inc. (Sept. 25, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Secretary, FTC, to John P. Wintrol and
Frederick H. Graefe, Counsel to Nordisk-USA (Sept. 25, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law
Reform).
80. Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Secretary, FTC, to Charles E. Buffon, counsel to Eli
Lilly and Co. (June 13, 1980) ("[T]he Commission wishes to make it clear that, in accepting
the order, it does not intend a tacit statement of general Commission policy on the treatment
of foreign versus domestic companies. The Commission's general policy is to treat all companies
alike, whether foreign or domestic, since the fundamental focus of antitrust relief is upon 'competition' and not upon any particular competitor or group of competitors.") (on file with the
Journal of Law Reform.).
81. "It was determined that the special circumstances of this particular case warranted accepting the order in its current form rather than rejecting the order and forcing the case into
lengthy and costly litigation." Id.
82. Id. The FTC may be asserting that as a "negotiated compromise" the consent order
is closer to a contract between private parties than it is to governmental action covered by national treatment. See Response of Eli Lilly and Co. to Petitions of Novo Laboratories, Inc.,
and Nordisk-USA seeking to Amend Consent Order at 16-17, Lilly, 95 F.T.C. 538 (1980). If
so, the Commission is incorrect. National treatment prohibits all discrimination by any department of the government - executive, legislative, judicial, or administrative - against foreign
companies. See A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 550 (1961). It "comprehend[s) the whole
range of factors affecting the competitive position of the foreign company in relation to the
domestic company." R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL
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mission apparently felt that according national treatment to the Danish
petitioners - under the mistaken belief that national treatment required
their equal access to the technology 83 - would foreclose any agreement with Eli Lilly and result in time-consuming, expensive litigation. 84
By failing to correctly analyze the impact of national treatment obligations, both Calnetics Corp. and Lilly strained United States trade relations. In addition, at least in the case of Lilly, this lapse resulted in
an economically faulty remedial order. Perhaps, had the tribunals been
forced to articulate their economic analysis, the cases would have come
out differently.
C.

A Modest Proposal: Explicit Statement of Supporting Grounds

Tribunal ignorance or misunderstanding of national treatment obligations may be easily corrected. All remedial antitrust orders prescribing
disparate treatment for a foreign firm or firms should be required to
explicitly state supporting economic grounds. 85 Too often, antitrust
orders fail to explain their logical underpinnings. 86 Explicit analysis
of the criteria underlying relief orders should go far to neutralize claims
of national treatment violations. This is particularly true in facially
discriminatory situations such as Lilly. Such a procedure will not
foreclose all argument; it should, however, focus the dispute on the
relevant economic considerations behind the decision. 87
LAW 198 (1960). Moreover, a "consent decree, although based upon an agreement of the parties
rather than a finding of facts by the court, is not a mere authentication or recording of that
agreement. It is a judicial act." United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 46 F. Supp. 654, 655
(D. Del. 1942); see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1931). It shares all the
attributes of a litigated judgment. 2 w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
§ 14.2 at 280 (3d ed. 1982).
83. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 81.
85. This general proposition was enthusiastically set forth in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
[To protect from administrative arbitrariness, courts] should require administrative
officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible . . . . [D]ecisions should more often be supported
with findings of fact and reasoned opinions. When administrators provide a framework
for principled decision-making, the result will ... enhanc[e] the integrity of the administrative process . . . .
Id. at 598.
86. The FTC for many years had a reputation for simply announcing its conclusions in general
terms. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.29, at 129 (2d ed. 1980). The unsupported decision in Lilly concerning differential treatment for foreign competitors may be evidence
of a return to that tradition. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In any event, tribunals
and the government long have been criticized for underemphasizing the importance of antitrust
relief and prescribing ineffective remedial measures. See I NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra note
I, at 114, 116, 125; K. ELZINGA & w. BREIT, supra note 3, at 45-48, 51.
87. The question on appeal would then be whether the listed criteria support the remedy
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Implementing this policy will not entail far-reaching policy or procedural changes. The law already provides an enforcement mechanism
at the appellate level: the Supreme Court has ruled that a reviewing
court may vacate and remand when a tribunal has not adequately explained the basis for its decision. 88 Moreover, this vacate-and-remand
procedure has been applied to a tribunal order where the grounds for
the disparate treatment of similarly situated parties were not reasonably
discernible. 89 Therefore, if a foreign company can show that it was
without explanation accorded less favorable treatment than a comparable
domestic company, the appellate court should vacate and remand. The
lower tribunal must then articulate the grounds for the disparate treatment, including the criteria and logic employed in formulating such
relief. This policy would force factfinding antitrust tribunals to rely
openly and explicitly on objective economic criteria. Benefits in the
form of decreased litigation and minimized international tension should
greatly outweigh the cost of implementing what the tribunals putatively
have been doing all along.

D.

Earlier Cases Revisited

Remanding the cases discussed in Part 111-B to the factfinding
tribunals for articulation of the grounds supporting the remedy should
result in improved economic analysis and decisionmaking. 90 The appellate court in Calnetics Corp. appears to have attempted this course.
It remanded the case and ordered the district court to reevaluate the
import ban in light of United States national treatment obligations as
well as competitive effects in the markets for automobiles and automobile air conditioners. 91 Because the parties settled, 92 however, it cannot
- a much better defined issue for litigants and courts than a facially discriminatory decree without
reasoning ..
88. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 196-97 (1941). This policy finds support in the requirement of FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a) that "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law;"
see 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2577 (1971), and Administrative Procedure Act § 557(c), 5 U.S.C. 557(c) (1976), which calls for "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis" supporting agency action; K. DAVIS, supra note 86,
§ 14.21.
89. Contractors Transp. Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976) (vacated
and remanded to Interstate Commerce Commission for explanation of the basis for its uneven
disposition of two substantially similar applications).
90. See Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative
Orders, 1969 DuKE L.J. 199, 206-10; but see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA.
L. REv. 239 (1973). It should ensure the court's consideration of all relevant factors and permit
more careful analysis. See United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1964); 9 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 88, at § 2571.
91. 532 F.2d 674, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1976).
92. See supra note 63.
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be established whether upon second examination the trial court would
have supported its relief order with objective economic analysis and,
as a result, satisfied the treaty obligations.
The FTC's decision in Lilly should be remanded for a more adequate explanation of its economic reasoning. Closer analysis of antitrust
and national treatment principles would force the FTC to impartially
evaluate the market position of the petitioning Danish companies, using
the same standards applied to domestic firms. This objective economic
evaluation should uncover the flaw in the Commission's previous order.
There is no conceivable economic rationale under which all foreign
firms, including potential market entrants, should be excluded. 93 By
excluding all foreign firms in its licensing order the FTC thus misapplied economic analysis and blatantly violated national treatment commitments to Denmark and every other country with which the United
States has a similar treaty. 94
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the two Danish petitioners have an absolute right to acquire these licenses. Their arguments
confuse the national treatment requirement that foreign and domestic
firms be treated equally with the contention that all foreign and domestic
firms be treated as equals. 95 Because these two firms are major producers in the world market 96 they may not require these licenses to
compete effectively with Eli Lilly in the United States. Market conditions may be such that the optimum competitive climate will be established if only those firms with lower total sales have access to the Eli
Lilly patents and technology.
Eli Lilly did argue that access to its patents and technology by the
Danish petitioners was unnecessary because of the Danish companies'
substantial market capabilities. 97 This argument, however, went too
93. There may, however, be a need for a narrow national security exception allowing the
complete exclusion of foreign firms. This exception "should be explicitly limited in time and
scope and adopted only where necessary to serve ... overriding interests." Shenefield Remarks,
supra note 56, at 6.
Protectionist tendencies can lead to the national security exception "swallowing the rule" as
a recent dispute involving the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) illustrates. FCC regulations require telephone utilities to award all contracts to the lowest bidder. Nevertheless, when
the lowest bid for part of a 700 mile fiberoptics line was from a Japanese company, the FCC
and some members of Congress forced the telephone company to award the contract to the
lowest domestic bidder on the grounds that the line was a "vital communications link" important
to United States national security. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1981, at 33, col. 6.
94. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
95. The latter is a kind of formal egalitarianism that does not follow from the concept of
equality. Equality is commonly thought to mean the proposition that "like types should be treated
alike." Its correlative, that "unalike [types) should be treated unalike" illustrates that disparate
provisions for foreign and domestic companies do not necessarily violate national treatment
guarantees. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 539-40, 572 (1982).
96. See W. Mueller, supra note 45, at 7-10.
97. See supra text accompanying note 77. ·
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far and overinclusively grouped -all foreign firms with the two Danish
petitioners. 98 Yet antitrust relief differentiates only on the basis of objective economic criteria, not alienage. 99 By proposing an alienage
distinction along with protectionist arguments, 100 Eli Lilly seemed to
be urging the United States government to shield American industry
by illegally discriminating against foreign companies. 101
The explicit use of evenhanded economic analysis, supported by a
thorough understanding of the complementary relationship of antitrust
and national treatment principles, would have narrowed, if not prevented
the Lilly dispute. It might have allowed the FTC to exclude the two
firms it apparently reasoned had little need for competitive assistance.
Concomitantly, charges alleging national treatment violations would
have been deterred by the explicit reliance on uncolored economic
criteria.
CONCLUSION

Many remedial antitrust orders distinguishing between foreign and

domestic competitors have prompted foreign government protests on
national treatment grounds. 102 As the United States finds itself in an
increasingly interdependent world, 103 reliant to a great extent on international trade, 104 it must strive to avoid foreign relations conflicts caused
by tribunal insensitivity or misinterpretation of sovereign obligations.
Indeed, trade hostility and retaliation often result when a parent country
believes impermissible discrimination is competitively hindering its overseas business entities. 105
98. See Response of Eli Lilly and Co., supra note 77, at 19-21, 23-24.
99. See supra text accompanying note 51.
100. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
IOI. The FfC's acceptance of the alienage distinction, without repudiating Eli Lilly's protectionist justifications, adds weight to Danish national treatment claims. See Letter from John
P. Wintrol and Frederick H. Graefe, Counsel to Nordisk-USA, to Carol M. Thomas, Secretary,
Federal Trade Commission, 4 (Mar. 18, 1981) (on file with Journal of Law Reform).
102. See, e.g., Danish Note Verbale, supra note 73 (regarding alleged national treatment violations in Lilly); Note Verbale from Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to Department
of State (Nov. 10, 1972), reprinted in Calnetics Corp., 353 F. Supp. at 1225 app. (regarding
alleged national treatment violations in Calnetics Corp. relief order). That all such remedial orders
have not been opposed should not be taken to mean that observance of national treatment obligations is unnecessary or unimportant. Rather, where the remedial orders were unopposed, there
was no direct impact on a foreign party.
103. See 2 NAT'L ANTITRUST COMM'N, supra note 1, at 292, 298; see generally R. COOPER,
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 3-23 (1968).
104. See Shenefield Remarks, supra note 56, at 3; see also supra notes 7 & I I.
105. See British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 558 F.2d 75, 86 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) (controversy
over barring Concorde aircraft from New York airport results in difficulties in renegotiating
international agreement regulating air transport between United States and United Kingdom);
N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1982, at D2, col. I (European Economic Community files charges against
Japan under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") alleging Japanese discrimina-
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This Note attempts to overcome tribunal insensitivity and improve
FCN treaty interpretation by developing a framework of analysis that
reconciles national treatment and antitrust principles. This analysis
establishes that antitrust remedies tailored to the facts and circumstances
of a market, without separate allowance for foreign competitors, dp
not violate national treatment treaty provisions. The reverse is true:
objective antitrust remedies will always be nondiscriminatory. This Note
also advocates enhancing tribunal sensitivity to national treatment
obligations through the increased use of explicit economic criteria in
the formulation of antitrust relief. Such articulated decisionmaking can
be easily encouraged by appellate remand when a remedial antitrust
order's disparate foreign impact is based on grounds other than objective economic criteria.

-Al Van Kampen

tion against European exports); N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1982, § 4, at 3, col. 1 (United States Special
Trade Representative William Brock warns Japan that United States will retaliate if not allowed
equal access to the Japanese market); N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at D14, col. 6 (United States
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge states he "favor[s] retaliatory trade measures against
Japan unless it showed a greater willingness to accept American exports."); N.Y. Times, Jan.
13, 1982, at D2, col. 4 (United States files complaint against Canada under GATT alleging that
Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act violates national treatment provisions of GATT; if
the United States proves discrimination, a GA TT panel may authorize the United States to adopt
retaliatory measures against Canadian trade.); N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1981, at D23, col. 1 (United
States files countervailing duty suits against a number of foreign countries accusing them of
unfairly subsidizing steel exports to the United States; Commerce Secretary Baldridge states concern over the prospect of a global trade war resulting from these actions.).

